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I. Introduction 
  A remarkable feature of most industries is that at any given moment there is great 
variation in the size of producers. The bulk of the firms are concentrated at smaller sizes, 
but there are also a number of larger firms whose size distribution closely resembles the 
upper tail of the Log-Normal and its cousins, the Pareto and Yule distributions. These 
patterns have been shown to be consistent with a simple model in which for firms above 
a minimum efficient size, production is subject to constant returns to scale and firm 
growth rates are stochastic realizations from a distribution whose mean and variance is 
independent of firm size. Apart from the constant returns to scale specification, these 
models do not have much economic content. Consequently, they cannot tell us much 
about the fundamental drivers of firm growth or about the moments of the firm-size dis-
tribution, which are the key determinants of an industry’s market structure. 
  In some ways it has been fortunate that the empirical reality of firm growth has 
turned out to be more complicated than the early stochastic growth models assumed. 
Increased availability in recent years of confidential establishment data, along with the 
development of a few comparable panel data sets, has enabled a more complete under-
standing of the empirics of firm growth. It has become apparent that among surviving 
producers, both the mean and variance of firm growth decline with firm size and also 
with firm age, even after controlling for the other factor. The probability of exit also 
similarly declines with both firm size and age, but if exiting firms are assigned a −100% 
growth rate and included in the analysis then mean growth is no longer related to firm 
age.
1 The size distribution of firms within a single age cohort also evolves with age; its 
mean and variance rise and the skewness falls as the cohort ages (Cabral and Mata 
                                          
1 Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson’s [1989] finding of large age effects in the US Census of Manu-
factures  is perhaps the best known set of findings about age. But age effects have been observed 
in other multi-industry samples constructed from census data (Disney, Haskel and Heden [2000]; 
Baldwin et al. [2000]; Persson [2002-Sweden]) in Dun and Bradstreet data (Evans [1987a, 1987b]),  
Compustat data (Hall [1987]), and numerous specialized samples (e.g. (Audretsch [1991]; 
Audretsch and Mahmood [1995]; Baldwin and Gorecki [1991], Mata and Portugal [1994];  Wagner 
[1994]).  
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[2003]). These patterns have been challenging to explain, suggesting that they should be 
revealing about the fundamental determinants of firm growth and market structure. The 
age effects have posed the greatest challenges—the size effects can be explained by mod-
els in which firms experience persistent productivity shocks and production is subject to 
decreasing returns to scale (cf. Hopenhayn [1992]). But the effects of age on growth and 
exit suggest there are other factors correlated with age that remain unaccounted for in 
our analyses. 
  Remarkably, few theories identify what these missing factors might be. A pioneering 
exception is Jovanovic’s [1982] model of selection, which famously predicts a negative 
effect of firm age on the variance of growth and, in many datasets, a positive effect of 
age on survival.
2 His omitted variable is the precision of a firm’s beliefs about its quality, 
which rises with age. More recently, Cooley and Quadrini [2001] have generated size-
conditional age effects on growth from a model that combines financial market frictions 
with persistent shocks to firm productivity. Young firms are assumed to enter the indus-
try as high-productivity firms and, in the presence of financial frictions, high-
productivity firms experience more rapid and more volatile growth. The omitted variable 
in this case is variations in the debt-equity ratio that are correlated with age.
3 While 
both theories are impressive in their explanatory power, it is also important to recognize 
their limitations. Jovanovic’s model does not predict the effect of age on mean growth 
and Cooley and Quadrini’s model does not predict the effect of age on the probability of 
exit. Furthermore, neither model addresses why the age effect on mean growth only 
holds for surviving producers. Both models also require some rather precise assump-
tions—priors and signals in Jovanovic’s model must be Normally distributed (Pakes and 
Ericson [1998]) and entrants must be more productive than all incumbents in Cooley and 
Quadrini’s model. 
                                          
2 Jovanovic’s model predicts that survival is initially declining, and then increasing, with age. 
However, the initial negative relationship between age and survival holds only for very young 
firms, and may not be easily observable in census data that span five-year intervals. 
3 Cabral and Mata [2003] also propose a model of financial constraints to explain the evolution of 
the firm size distribution they observe in data from the Portuguese manufacturing sector.  
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  The main purpose of this paper is to propose another channel through which age 
affects firm performance that transparently accounts for all the age-size regularities as 
well as additional related regularities. We start from the self-evident fact that the way 
we are accustomed to define industries in empirical work (almost invariably by SIC 
code) suppresses a large amount of heterogeneity in firm activity. Firms defined as be-
longing to the same industry could, if only we had the appropriate data, be differentiated 
along numerous dimensions, such as the technology they use, the services they provide, 
the customer segments they target, or the geographic areas in which they operate. We 
call these different activities submarkets. It is equally self-evident that in many indus-
tries, these submarkets have their own dynamics. New opportunities arise, and only firms 
that succeed in exploiting them benefit from their arrival. Existing submarkets vanish as 
technologies become obsolete, as geographic areas decline, or as regulations change, and 
all firms dependent on these submarkets suffer as a consequence. Indeed, firms that are 
specialized in a single submarket can be expected to vanish when the submarket dies. 
  We can’t imagine that our distinction between the static, homogeneous, industry-as-
SIC-code world of empirical analysis, and the dynamic, heterogeneous, collection of sub-
markets that most industries consist of is either contentious or surprising to most read-
ers. Perhaps more surprising is that, in a world of submarkets, age will be found to affect 
growth and survival any time the econometrician fails to control for the number of sub-
markets in which each firm is active. We show this in a model in which industries consist 
of finitely-lived, differentiated submarkets, which we cast as the sole driving force behind 
entry, exit and firm growth. A firm’s growth is negatively related, and its survival is 
positively related, to the number of submarkets in which it is active. At the same time, 
the number of submarkets in which a firm is active is increasing in age. We show that 
this simple framework transparently generates precisely the effects of age on mean 
growth, the variance of growth and the evolution of the size distribution that have been 
observed in the data. We show it also explains a number of other regularities, including 
properties of the firm-size distribution, mean reversion in firm size over long, but not 
short, time horizons, and variations in the sizes and diversity of entrants, exiting firms, 
and surviving firms.   
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  Submarkets have already been the subject of some recent theorizing about industry 
evolution. Sutton [1998] used the idea of growth opportunities appearing randomly in the 
form of new submarkets in an industry to develop his theory of the firm-size distribu-
tion.
4 Without using the nomenclature of submarkets, Klette and Kortum [2004] develop 
a model driven by optimizing behavior that is similar in spirit to Sutton’s. Their model 
is also consistent with the regularities about the firm size distribution, and also the rela-
tionship between firm size, growth and exit.
5 
   Our model is similar to Sutton's in that we assume all opportunities for growth cor-
respond to the creation of new submarkets. But similar to Klette and Kortum we also 
build in a mechanism for firm contraction and exit. We do so by assuming that all sub-
markets have randomly determined but finite life. We also assume that each submarket 
consists of multiple firms with varying market share.  As will become evident below, 
these two features are the means by which our model generates the precise effects of age 
on growth and survival observed in the data.  
  We hope that our ability to explain all the age-size regularities using a ubiquitous 
feature of industrial activity will inspire confidence in the importance of submarket phe-
nomena in the process of firm growth. We can also readily point to industries analyzed 
by others where submarkets have been the key to differential rates of firm growth. For 
example, in hard disk drives Christensen [1993] implicates new submarkets opened by 
smaller disk drives as the cause of the leading incumbents repeatedly being displaced by 
                                          
4 Support for Sutton’s model has been found in the US cement industry (Sutton [1998]), the Ital-
ian motor insurance industry (Buzzacchi and Valletti [2002]), Spanish retail banking (de Juan 
[2003]), and the Irish soft drink industry (Walsh and Whelan [2002]). Bottazzi et al. [2001] also 
found that new submarkets driven by the discovery of new drugs help explain the evolution of the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
5 In Klette and Kortum, firms exploit new opportunities that arise as a result of their own R&D 
efforts, and they contract as a result of the efforts of their competitors. Their formal treatment of 
R&D also enables them to make predictions about the distribution of R&D intensity across firms, 
the relationship between R&D and firm size, and the evolution of R&D over time, all of which 
accord with the evidence.  
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new entrants and other incumbents.
6 In pharmaceuticals, Bottazzi et al. [2001] develop a 
stylized model of submarket branching to explain variations in firm growth rates. We go 
beyond these examples to analyze the importance of submarkets in yet another modern 
industry, the laser industry. We derive a series of distinctive hypotheses from our model 
that we test using data on the types of lasers produced by entrants into the industry 
over its first 30 years. Our analysis suggests that submarket creation and destruction 
played a key role in the entry, exit, and growth of laser producers.  
  Much as the early stochastic growth models were criticized for their lack of eco-
nomic content, it will be tempting to criticize our model similarly. Unlike the early sto-
chastic growth models, though, our model identifies the source of firm growth and pro-
vides structure on how it is expected to operate. It is true that our model is consistent 
with a lot of different underlying economic mechanisms, but we see this as a virtue be-
cause it shows off the power of submarket phenomena to explain the accumulating regu-
larities. It also demonstrates that the regularities may not be as revealing as we might 
have hoped about the mechanisms underlying firm growth. With three explanations on 
the table for the regularities, evidence will be needed about the quantitative importance 
of each to judge their relevance. The industry examples noted above and our analysis of 
the laser industry represent our initial foray into this domain. At the same time, the fact 
that we can explain all the regularities with such a simple model suggests that it might 
be useful to look elsewhere to come up with further insights into the determinants of 
firm growth. One place where we suggest looking is industry irregularities—patterns that 
hold only in some industries, particularly patterns regarding market structure, which was 
the impetus for much of this literature. Our model predicts that the number of firms in a 
new industry should monotonically rise over time, which is what occurred in the laser 
industry. But it has also been shown that certain industries, such as autos, tires, and 
television receivers, experienced extremely sharp shakeouts in the number of producers 
as they aged despite robust growth in total production (Klepper and Simons [1997]). Our 
model provides a way to think about what might have been different in these industries 
                                          
6 Two subsequent efforts have carefully analyzed entry into the new submarkets (King and Tucci 
[2002], Chesbrough [2003]).  
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regarding submarkets that could account for their shakeouts. This discussion also helps 
delineate the kinds of industries to which our model is most applicable. 
  The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we develop the model and derive its 
implications for the effects of age and size on firm growth and survival. In Section III we 
report additional predictions of the model and compare them with the evidence. In Sec-
tion IV we relate the model to evidence from the laser industry. Section V offers some 
observations on the implications of our analysis. 
II. Submarkets and the effects of age and size 
  An industry is composed of various submarkets. The industry begins at time t=0 
when its first submarket is created. Subsequently, submarkets are created according to a 
homogeneous Poisson point process with mean intensity λ, so that to a first-order ap-
proximation there is a probability λdt of a new submarket being created in the interval 
dt. Each submarket has a random life, z, drawn from the distribution H(z). It is assumed 
only that H(z) is differentiable almost everywhere with finite mean submarket life, 
0 () zdH z µ
∞
= ∫ .
7 There are C potential entrants to each submarket. Each has a prob-
ability of θ of entering a new submarket, where θ  is the same for all firms and submar-
kets. Upon entering, the firm’s size in the submarket is drawn from the distribution F(x), 
F(0)=0, where F is continuous and strictly increasing. This size remains constant for the 
duration of the submarket and then goes to zero as soon as the submarket is destroyed. 
Total firm size at any point in time is therefore the random sum of n draws from the 
distribution F, where n is the number of currently existing submarkets that the firm en-
tered.  
  In modeling industry evolution and firm dynamics as an exogenous stochastic proc-
ess, we do not intend to discount the role of rational firm choice. To the contrary, we 
assume that the stochastic process is driven by a well-defined maximization problem for 
each firm. But whatever the details of the maximization problem, it will yield an equilib-
                                          
7 For some results, we must assume that firm dynamics are Markovian. This requires that H(z) is 
exponential.  
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rium entry rate, θ, and a distribution of firm sizes among entrants, F(x).
 8 None of our 
results depends on the particular value of θ or the form of F(x), and we do not analyze 
the effects of policy. Hence, the generality afforded by the reduced form serves us well.  
  Firms may enter and exit a state of zero submarket activity, and in this setting, all 
firms live forever. To address questions of entry and exit, we therefore adopt the follow-
ing convenient stylization. Consider two sampling times, t and t+T. At time t, we define 
the age, s(t), of the firm as the length of time that has elapsed since it last entered a 
state of zero submarket activity. At time t+T, we identify a firm as an exit if it is active 
in no submarkets and it was in one or more submarkets at time t. An entrant is defined 
symmetrically as a firm active in one or more submarkets at time t+T that was active in 
no submarkets at time t. This treatment enables us to exploit properties of generalized 
equilibrium Poisson point processes to address questions that have usually proved intrac-
table. 
A. Preliminary results 
  The number of active submarkets in the industry changes over time, which causes 
the number of active submarkets in which firms participate to change over time. Our 
first task is to establish distributions for the number of active submarkets and for firm 
                                          
8 See Klette and Kortum [2004] for one such example. To provide an alternative example, assume 
a new submarket allows firms that successfully exploit it to sell output at a price p. Firms under-
take R&D in an attempt to exploit the new opportunity. R&D yields a cost parameter, α, drawn 
from the distribution G(a;R), which is increasing in R&D expenditure, R. Profits are 
[ ] () () m a x0 , m a x () x px c x k πα α = −− , where k is a fixed cost of production and c(x) is increasing 
and convex. This technology defines an upper threshold, α , for the cost draw, above which the 
firm chooses not to enter. Each firm’s optimal level of R&D is given by 
00 *a r g m a x ( )( ; ) ( )
rz R R dG R e dH z
α
πα α
∞ − = − + 
  ∫ ∫ . Hence, the fraction of firms entering a sub-
market is  (; * ) GR θα = . Let α(x) denote the cost draw that yields an optimal output of x. The 
distribution of firm output is then given by 
()
1 ( ; *) (1 ( ; *)) ( ; *)
x




− = − ∫ . Endoge-
nizing p by defining a submarket in terms of aggregate demand, D(p), or assuming that submar-
ket arrivals are also driven by R&D effort, are straightforward extensions.  
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participation in submarkets. While we can characterize transitory distributions for any 
time t, much of our analysis is concerned with market structure in the stationary state. 
The transitory distributions are therefore given as lemmas in the appendix, while Propo-
sitions 1 and 2 provide the corresponding characterization in the stationary state. All 
proofs are also contained in the appendix. 
PROPOSITION 1. Let pk(t), k=0,1, 2, 3 . . ., denote the probability that exactly k submar-
kets are active at time t. The stationary distribution,  lim ( ) kt k pp t →∞ = , exists 




− = .  
It is somewhat remarkable, although well known from the theory of queues (e.g. Takács 
[1958]), that the Poisson distribution holds independently of the form of the distribution 
H(z). There is a direct counterpart for the distribution of an arbitrary firm’s participa-
tion in active submarkets. Excluding the industry’s first submarket, the number of sub-
markets in which a firm is active is the sum of n independent Bernoulli trials with prob-
ability of success θ, where n is Poisson with mean  [ ]
0 1( )
t
Hz d z λ − ∫ . This random sum 
also has a Poisson distribution.  
PROPOSITION 2. Let vk(t) denote the probability that a firm is active in exactly k submar-
kets at time t. The stationary distribution,  lim ( ) kt k vv t →∞ = , exists and is given 




− = . 
  While there will be variation over time in industry and firm output, the model gen-
erates stable limiting distributions for the number of industry submarkets and the num-
ber of submarkets in which firms are active. The number of active submarkets has an 
asymptotic mean and variance of λµ, and the number of firms active in at least one 
submarket has an asymptotic mean of C(1−v0)= C(1−e
−θλµ). Both are increasing in the 
rate at which submarkets are created and in the mean duration of a submarket, while 
the latter is also increasing in the probability of firm entry and the size of the entry pool. 
  A firm’s size depends not only on the number of active submarkets in which it par-
ticipates, but also on the sizes at which it enters each one. Firm size,  1
n
i i yx = = ∑ , is the 
sum of a random number, n, of i.i.d. random variables where each term in the sum is a  
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draw from the distribution F(x) and the number of terms is Poisson. It is generally only 
feasible to characterize the distribution of a random sum in terms of its characteristic 
function. Let φx(r) denote the characteristic function of the distribution F. Then, condi-
tional on a firm being active in n submarkets, the characteristic function of the sum 
1
n
i i yx = = ∑ is simply the n-fold product of φx(r). The characteristic function, φy(r), for 
the unconditional distribution of firm size is obtained by taking the expectation over n. 
As we will need to condition on firm age, s, the first task is to obtain a distribution for 
n(s):  
PROPOSITION 3. Let (() ,) k ws tt  denote the probability that a firm of age s at time t, s(t), 
is active in exactly k submarkets at time t. Then  () l i m (() ,) kt k ws ws tt →∞ =  exists 





sH z d z θρ θλ = − ∫ . 
In the steady-state, for firms of any age the distribution of the number of submarkets in 
which they participate is Poisson, but the mean is strictly increasing in age. There is also 
a corresponding steady-state distribution of the sizes of these firms. The characteristic 
function of this distribution is derived in the appendix and generates the following mo-
ments: 
 





Ex Hz d z θλ − ∫ ,  variance  [] 2
0
() 1 ( )
s





1( ) ( ) ( ) 0
s
Hz d z Ex Ex θλ
−
−      − >       ∫ . 
Regardless of the form of F(x), the distribution is positively skewed and has the same 
long tail to the right as the Poisson. The older the cohort, the greater the mean and 
variance and the smaller the skewness of firm size. These predicted properties of the size 
distribution match precisely those found for Portuguese manufacturing firms by Cabral 
and Mata [2003], which had been presented as a challenge for theory to explain.   
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B. The effects of size and age on survival 
  Firms can only exit if their activity first declines to one submarket. Consequently, 
the more submarkets a firm is in then the lower its chance of exiting in any finite time 
period. This result is stated as Proposition 5.  
PROPOSITION 5. For any  ,( 0 , ) tT∈∞ , the probability of exit by time (t+T) is strictly 
decreasing in n(t). 
  The relationship between age, size and survival is complicated by the fact that, for 
arbitrary H(z), history matters, and the age of the firm is bound up with submarket age 
and the hazard of submarket destruction in possibly complicated ways.
9 If H(z) is as-
sumed to be exponential, however, the stochastic process is Markovian. The probability 
of submarket destruction is then independent of the age of submarkets, and n(t) is a suf-
ficient statistic for the probability of exit. Proposition 3 implies that n(t) is positively 
related to a firm’s age, s(t). Since firm size equals the product of n(t) and the average 
size of the firm in each of its submarkets, it is also positively related to n(t). Firm age 
and firm size are related to n(t) in different ways, and thus both will be positively re-
lated to n(t) even conditional on the other. Therefore, it follows that: 
PROPOSITION 6. If H(z) is exponential, for any  ,( 0 , ) tT∈∞ the probability of exit by time 
(t+T) is a strictly decreasing function of y(t) and s(t). 
  Proposition 6 implies that the probability of exit will decline with firm size holding 
firm age constant and will decline with firm age holding firm size constant, consistent 
with the evidence.  
                                          
9 Firm age is correlated with the ages of the submarkets in which the firm is active (Lemma 3 in 
the appendix proves that submarket age is increasing in firm age in the sense of first-order sto-
chastic dominance). This in turn influences the probabilities of submarket destruction and hence 
the probability of firm exit.  
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C. The effects of size and age on firm growth 
  In this subsection, we derive propositions that address the relationships between 
firm growth rates and firm age and size. It is useful to restate the evidence on growth, as 
it is quite specific: 
G-1: Conditional on firm survival, average firm growth declines with firm size 
holding firm age constant and declines with firm age holding firm size constant 
(Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson [1989], Evans [1987], Hall [1987]).  
G-2: Assigning a fractional growth rate of –1 to exiting firms, the inverse 
growth-size relationship holds for all firms but it is weaker than for surviving 
firms, while the inverse growth-age relationship does not hold for all firms 
[Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson [1989]). 
G-3: The variance of firm growth declines with firm size holding firm age constant 
(Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson [1989], Hymer and Pashigian [1962], Mansfield 
[1962], Stanley, et. al. [1996], Sutton [2000]) and declines with firm age holding firm 
size constant (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson [1989]). 
  The empirical evidence on the relationship between mean firm growth and firm age 
and size depends on whether one conditions on firm survival. We begin with the model’s 
predictions for the unconditional case, G-2:  
PROPOSITION 7. Among all firms, mean firm growth is strictly decreasing in firm size 
conditional on firm age, but ambiguously related to firm age conditional on firm 
size. 
The ambiguity in the effects of age is the result of the fact that, for arbitrary H(z), the 
hazard of submarket destruction may rise or fall with submarket age. In the Markovian 
case, the hazard is constant, so that for H(z) exponential we have the following result:  
COROLLARY. Suppose H(z) is exponential. Among all firms, mean firm growth is strictly 
decreasing in firm size conditional on age, but unrelated to firm age conditional 
on size.
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  The net change in a firm’s size in any time period equals its output in submarkets 
created during the time period minus its output in submarkets destroyed during the time 
period. All firms have the same expected increment to size due to the creation of new 
submarkets. Consequently, the expected proportional increase in size due to the creation 
of new submarkets is a decreasing function of firm size and is independent of firm age. 
Assuming H(z) is exponential, the expected decrement to firm size due to the destruction 
of submarkets is proportional to the firm’s size at the start of the period. Hence, the ex-
pected proportional decline in a firm’s size due to the destruction of submarkets is inde-
pendent of its size and its age. Therefore, the expected growth rate of firms is a decreas-
ing function of firm size and is independent of firm age.  
  Regularity G-1 can be explained as follows. Conditioning on survival strengthens the 
inverse relationship between expected firm growth and firm size. Smaller firms have a 
greater probability of exit, which depresses their overall growth rate. Consequently, con-
ditioning on survival increases the growth rate of smaller firms by more than larger 
firms, which enhances the negative effect of firm size on mean growth. Conditioning on 
firm survival also allows for firm age to affect firm growth through its influence on the 
probability of exit. With younger firms having higher exit rates, conditioning on firm 
survival increases the growth rates of younger firms more than older ones, inducing a 
negative relationship between expected firm growth and firm age. This is stated formally 
in the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 8. Assume H(z) is exponential. Conditional on firm survival, mean firm 
growth is strictly decreasing in firm size conditional on firm age and strictly de-
creasing in firm age conditional on firm size. The negative effect of size on mean 
growth is stronger when conditioning on survival than when not conditioning.  
  Regularity G-3, concerning the variance of firm growth rates, can be explained as 
follows. Submarket destruction and creation are independent. Consequently, the variance 
of growth for a firm of size y(t) active in n(t) submarkets can be written as the sum of 
the variance of changes in firm size caused by entry into new submarkets and changes 
caused by destruction of some or all of the existing n(t) submarkets. We show in the ap- 
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pendix that the variance of the growth rate contributed by entry into new submarkets is 
decreasing in firm size but independent of n(t). We also show, for the exponential case, 
that the variance of the proportional loss in output due to the destruction of submarkets 
is decreasing, not only in y(t), but also in n(t). Firms with more submarkets are able to 
pool their losses due to submarket destruction over more submarkets, which will lower 
the variance of their lost output. In view of the relationship already established between 
firm age and submarket participation, it follows that:  
PROPOSITION 9. Assume H(z) is exponential.  Among all firms, the variance of firm 
growth is strictly decreasing in firm size conditional on firm age and strictly de-
creasing in firm age conditional on firm size. 
III. Additional Predictions 
  Some additional empirical regularities arise as immediate consequences of the struc-
ture of the model. For example, the average size of entrants and exiting firms, both of 
which are active in just a single submarket, is less than that of surviving incumbents, 
consistent with the evidence in Cable and Schwalbach [1991]. Other predictions of the 
model are not so immediate. In this section we report some of them and relate them to 
empirical evidence accumulated over the last couple of decades.  
A. Entry, exit and the size distribution of firms  
  The mean entry and exit rates are, to first order, both equal to 
/(1 ) dte e
θλµ θλµ θλ
−− − . Hence, consistent with the cross-sectional evidence (Cable and 
Schwalbach [1991], Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson [1988], Evans and Siegfried [1994]), 
the model predicts that industries characterized by higher entry rates also have higher 
exit rates.  
  For younger industries yet to attain the steady state, the implications of the model 




PROPOSITION 10. Assume H(z) is exponential and (1 ) / θλ µ λµ < − . Then:  i) The num-
ber of active firms increases with industry age; ii) The rate of entry decreases with 
industry age; iii) The rate of exit may increase or decrease with industry age and 
need not vary monotonically with age. 
 
 The  condition  ( 1)/ θλ µ λµ < −  places an upper bound on the expected importance 
of the industry’s first submarket. If relatively few firms enter the first submarket, the 
number of firms is expected to increase over time toward a limiting steady-state value. If 
(1 ) / θλ µ λµ > − , the mean number of firms initially falls, but it still must eventually 
rise and approach its limiting steady state from below. Consequently, the number of po-
tential entrants (i.e., the number of firms with zero output) is expected to (eventually) 
decline over time, and hence the ratio of entrants to the number of firms is expected to 
(eventually) decline. The number of submarkets in which firms participate is also ex-
pected to rise over time. However, the expected proportion of firms active in just one 
submarket (i.e., the firms that face a nonnegligible probability of exit in the subsequent 
interval dt) need not rise monotonically with time, so industries may experience exit 
rates that are non-monotonic with respect to industry age.  
  The moments of the steady-state firm-size distribution predicted by the model can 
be conveniently obtained by letting s →∞ in the moments reported in Proposition 3: 
PROPOSITION 11: The stationary steady-state firm-size distribution has mean θλµE(x), 
variance θλµE(x




 −3/2>0.  
Firms are larger on average, and the variance of firm size is greater, when firm entry 
into a new submarket is more likely, when new submarkets arrive more frequently, and 
when submarkets survive longer. If parameters take on similar values in the same indus-
try in different countries, then in each country industries will have a similar ordering in 
terms of measures related to the moments, such as the k-firm concentration ratio. There 
is an extensive literature on industry size distributions. Although in most industries 
there is considerable entry, exit, and mobility of firms, industry firm-size distributions  
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appear to be stable over time, with summary measures such as the k-firm concentration 
ratio taking on similar values in the same industry in different countries (e.g., Bain 
[1966], Pryor [1972]). 
  The distributions are generally positively skewed with a long upper tail (e.g., Ijiri 
and Simon [1977]). No single distribution fits all industries (Curry and George [1983], 
Schmalensee [1989]), but the upper tail of most industry firm-size distributions resembles 
a family of statistical distributions, including the Log-normal, Pareto, and Yule. Using a 
geometric distribution to approximate industry firm-size distributions, Sutton [1998] 
shows that the k-firm concentration ratio will satisfy a lower bound that is closely satis-
fied in manufacturing industries. The particular form of the firm-size distribution implied 
by the model can in principle be obtained by specifying F. Among the tractable cases, 
some familiar distributions emerge. If F has the discrete logarithmic distribution, then y 
is distributed as negative binomial (Lüders  [1934], Quenouille [1949]). The Yule distri-
bution associated with the work of Simon [1955] and colleagues can be obtained by com-
pounding the geometric distribution with a mixing distribution F(p)=p
w−1.
10 
  A distinctive feature of our model is that the industry firm-size distribution will dif-
fer from the distribution of market shares within submarkets, which cannot be a predic-
tion of models that assume a homogeneous industrial structure. Specifically, our model 
predicts that the industry distribution will always exhibit greater concentration than the 
within-submarket distribution. Figure 1 reports some revealing evidence from the US 
cement industry. Because of high transportation costs, Sutton [1998] argues that state 
boundaries provide a useful approximation to submarket boundaries. Figure 1 illustrates 
clearly that the national size distribution is much more concentrated than almost all the 
size distributions at the state level. Sutton further shows that the difference between the 
national and state size distributions is explained by the fact that larger firms operate 
across multiple submarkets, as would be expected based on our model. 
                                          
10 Of course, many firm-size distributions can be obtained from the model, and the same size dis-
tribution can be obtained from conceptually distinct models (Boswell and Patil [1970]), so not too 
much should be made of the model’s ability to generate any particular one.  
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B. Mean reversion in firm size 
  In any model combining a stationary firm size distribution with a persistent churn-
ing of firms, size must eventually be mean reverting. However, there is no requirement 
that mean reversion holds at all time horizons. Indeed, the evidence indicates that while 
firm size is mean reverting over long time horizons, it is not mean reverting over short 
horizons (Baldwin [1995, ch. 5], Bailey, Hulten, and Campbell [1992]). Our model pre-
dicts this.  
PROPOSITION 12. In the stationary state, there exists a T
*(y(t)) such that E[y(t+T
*)−y(t)] 
>[<] 0 as y(t) <[>] E(y), where E(y)= θλµE(x). 
Intuitively, larger firms participate in more submarkets on average and have a larger av-
erage output per submarket than smaller firms. Consequently, larger firms have more 
output to lose from the destruction of submarkets. In contrast, all firms have the same 
expected increment to size due to the creation of new submarkets. Consequently, firm 
growth is mean reverting.  
FIGURE 1. Lorenz curves for US cement industry. Graph contains Lorenz curves for 
each state, plus national curve (bold). Source: Sutton [1998, p. 310].  
 17
C. Firm diversification 
  Mitchell [2000] has noted two regularities that appear to characterize how diversity 
is related to firm size and age. First, firms tend to begin specialized and expand their 
scope as they age. Our model readily explains this. Firms enter in one submarket, and in 
the stationary state the expected number of submarkets in which a firm participates in-
creases (at a decreasing rate) with its age.
11 Second, diversification is positively related to 
firm size, so that within industries the largest firms have the broadest product portfolios. 
In our model, this result follows readily from the fact that larger firms on average have 
more submarkets. The appendix provides a formal proof, along with some related predic-
tions. 
PROPOSITION 13. (i) Larger firms are on average more diversified than smaller firms. (ii) 
The more diversified a firm, the greater the probability that it is a leader in one or more 
submarkets. (iii) The larger the firm, the greater the probability that it is a leader in one 
or more submarkets.
12 
IV. The US Laser Industry 
  We have shown that the model is capable of explaining a wide array of regularities 
pertaining to industry dynamics. We noted in the introduction that many of these regu-
larities could also be explained by the models of Jovanovic [1982] and Cooley and 
                                          
11 The claim can be verified formally on differentiating (twice) the mean of the distribution given 
in Proposition 3 with respect to firm age, s.  
12 We may note here some corollaries to Proposition 13. First, it is also true that diversified firms 
are more likely to be one of the smallest firms in one or more submarkets. In fact, if we learn that 
a firm fell into any particular range of the size distribution in a submarket, Bayes’ rule would 
cause us to raise our expectation of the number of active submarkets. This suggests that part (ii) 
of the proposition is not all that interesting (or more relevant, people’s attempts to exploit part 
(ii) as evidence of economies of scope/knowledge spillovers is not useful). Second, it is important 
to note that we cannot say the same about larger firms being more likely to be one of the smallest 
in one or more submarkets because of the effects of F(x) on size.   
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Quadrini [2001]. To provide further support for the importance of submarket phenom-
ena, we use data from the laser industry pertaining to submarkets to test distinctive im-
plications of our model. Some of these implications have already been derived and addi-
tional ones will be established. The only way these implications could be addressed in 
Jovanovic and Cooley and Quadrini’s models is if submarkets were differentiated and 
firm productivities were allowed to differ at the submarket level. Even then, it is not 
clear whether these models could account for the distinctive implications of our model. 
We make no pretense at comprehensively testing our model. Indeed, it is sufficiently 
stylized that no doubt some of its implications would fail exacting tests. Our goal is 
more modest. We want to show that in the laser industry, where submarkets have been 
prominent, distinctive predictions of our model are supported.  
  Submarkets can occur at many levels, but in lasers it is useful to think of them as 
corresponding to particular applications serviced by specific lasers. Lasers differ regard-
ing their power and the wavelength of light they emit, which constrains the applications 
for which they can be used. For example, very different lasers are required for scanning, 
eye surgery, and the working of metals. Consequently, the laser market can be thought 
of as being composed of submarkets with little if any relationship on the demand side, 
consistent with our model. 
  We don’t have data on each submarket, but we have data compiled by Klepper and 
Sleeper [2005] on nine broad categories of lasers that differ in terms of their lasing mate-
rial. Using abbreviations and putting dates of introduction in parentheses, they include: 
six gases, Helium Neon—HeNe (1961), Carbon Dioxide—CO2 (1966), Argon Ion—Ion 
(1966), Helium Cadmium—HeCd (1970), Excimer—Exc (1978), and a catchall category 
of Other Gas Lasers—GasOth (1963); solid state crystal lasers—SState (1961); semicon-
ductor lasers—Semic (1963); and chemical dye lasers—Dye (1968). Each of these broad 
laser types comes in different varieties that service different users and tend to be pro-
duced by different firms, so that generally multiple submarkets exist within each laser 
type. For example, different firms tend to produce short-wave semiconductor lasers used 
in CD players and laser printers than long-wave semiconductor lasers used in fiber op-
tics. Similarly, different firms tend to produce low-power CO2 lasers used in certain types 
of surgery than high-power CO2 lasers used in the working of certain materials.  
 19
  Over time, the number of laser submarkets has mushroomed. Some, such as the use 
of semiconductor lasers in CD players and in computer applications, were driven by the 
invention of the CD player and the advent of the personal computer. Others, such as the 
development of hand-held scanners, were created by the miniaturization of the HeNe la-
ser, which was the work-horse of stationary scanning applications. Submarkets have also 
been destroyed. In part, this has occurred by the improvement of nonlaser approaches to 
certain applications, such as surgery and printing. Perhaps more important is what 
might be termed creative destruction, which is the displacement of one type of laser by 
another, often within the same broad category. For example, the first material that was 
made to lase was a Ruby crystal, and initially Ruby lasers were used in many applica-
tions. Subsequently, Nd:Yag lasers, which are also solid state lasers, displaced Ruby in 
many applications. 
  We have annual data from Klepper and Sleeper [2005] on the types of lasers pro-
duced by each of 464 entrants into the U.S. commercial laser industry from its inception 
in 1961 through 1994. Firms tended to specialize by laser type, reflecting the limited 
number of submarkets in which they participated. Over their lifetime, 55% of the firms 
produced only one type of laser, 20% two types, 23% 3-6 types, and 2% 7-9 types. While 
the nine categories of lasers are typically broader than submarkets, most of the predic-
tions of the model pertain to laser types as well as submarkets.
13 We do not have output 
data, so we restrict our focus to the predictions concerning firm scope, entry, and exit.  
                                          
13 Each laser type encompasses a number of submarkets that arrive and may become obsolete at 
random points in time. Moreover, the year each laser type was launched marks nothing more 
than the arrival date of the first submarket using that type. Nonetheless, there is a simple rela-
tionship between the predictions of our model and the number of laser types produced by a firm. 
Consider a firm active in n submarkets, and assume that submarkets are distributed randomly 
among M laser types. If a firm is equally likely to enter any submarket, the expected number, m, 
of laser types being produced by the firm is  () ()
1 [] 1 1
n
Em M M
− = −− , which is strictly increas-
ing in n. Hence, if n is increasing in some variable, x, then so is E[m]. The relationship between m 
and n is an application of the general birthday problem, and we can in fact say rather more than 
this. For example, if the conditional distribution F(n|x) is decreasing in x, so is the conditional 
distribution F(m|x). If submarkets are not allocated with equal probability to laser types, ap-
proximations are necessary (Mase [1992]), but it appears that the result holds as long as the  
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  By way of background, in Figure 2 we present the annual number of producers, en-
trants, and exits for the period 1965 to 1994.
14 The patterns are broadly consistent with 
the model. The number of firms increased over time, consistent with Proposition 10. The 
entry rate was high initially and then declined, which is also consistent with Proposition 
10. Note the particularly low entry rate for most of the 1970s. This corresponds to a pe-
riod in which the laser was jokingly characterized as a solution looking for a problem, 
reflecting the slow rate at which new submarkets were created. The resurgence in entry 
during the 1980s corresponds with the development of new submarkets, especially in 
                                                                                                                         
probability of entering a submarket using a particular laser type exceeds zero for at least two la-
ser types.  
14 The main data source used to compile the list of producers began in 1965, and the only data we 
have for before 1965 pertains to the firms listed as producers in 1965. Consequently, we restrict 



























































Entry Rate (right axis)
Exit Rate (right scale)
FIGURE 2. Number of Producers, Entry and Exit Rates in the Laser Industry, 1965-
1994.  
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electronics and medical applications. The exit rate patterns are less distinctive, and 
Proposition 10 makes no predictions about the trend in the exit rate over time.
15  
  The model predicts that for the average firm, the number of submarkets in which it 
participates should increase with age. In Table 1, we present data on the average num-
ber of laser types produced by all firms from ages 1 to 34. Among the 464 firms, Table 1 
indicates that at age 1 they produced an average of 1.36 lasers. Not all of these firms 
survived past age 1, and Table 1 lists the number of survivors to each age and the aver-
age number of laser types produced by the survivors at each age. The average number of 
laser types increased monotonically through age 10, and after age 10 the trend continues 
upward through age 31, which was attained by only two firms. Thus, consistent with 
Proposition 3, the average number of laser types produced by all firms increased with 
age. We also report in Table 1 the average number of laser types produced by firms that 
never exited. It is conceivable that the number of laser types produced by all firms in-
creased with age due to the exit of firms that produced a smaller number of laser types. 
The patterns for the non-exiting firms are similar to all firms, though, suggesting that 
the rise in laser types with age for all firms is not due to exiting firms being markedly 
different from continuing firms. 
  While the evidence in Table 1 is consistent with the predictions of the model, the 
patterns may also be induced through other mechanisms, such as learning bringing about 
scope economies (c.f. Mitchell [2000]). We can derive yet more exacting predictions that 
can help distinguish such mechanisms from our explanation for the patterns. A majority 
of the laser firms ultimately exited. The model predicts these firms will produce only one 
type of laser just before exiting. Moreover, it predicts that the expected number of laser 
types they produce will monotonically decline with age, which is the opposite of the pre-
diction for all laser firms. More precisely, if observations on all firms that ultimately exit 
are ordered by the number of years prior to exit, the model implies that the mean num-
ber of submarkets in which firms participate is a monotonically increasing function of the 
                                          
15 Regressions of entry and exit rates on a linear time trend and lagged entry or exit return a sig-
nificant decline in the entry rate (p=0.09) and no trend in the exit rate (p=0.73).  
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number of years prior to exit. We prove this for the Markovian case in the appendix and 
state the result formally here: 
PROPOSITION 14. Assume H(z) is exponential. Let [( ) |( ) 0 ] Ent T nt − =  denote the ex-
pected number of submarkets in which a firm was active at time t−Τ, given that it is 
inactive at time t. In the stationary equilibrium, [ ( )| ( ) 0] Ent T nt − =  increases with 
T at a decreasing rate. 
 
TABLE 1 
 Average Number of Laser Types of Firms at Each Age 













1  1.36 (464)  1.31 (136)  18   2.10 (31)  2.12 (16) 
2  1.43 (336)  1.44 (115)  19  2.14 (28)  2.19 (16) 
3  1.51 (268)  1.48   (97)  20  2.12 (25)  2.21 (14) 
4  1.62 (227)  1.57   (81)  21  2.17 (23)  2.36 (14) 
5  1.66 (197)  1.54   (70)  22  2.19 (21)  2.33 (12) 
6  1.78 (166)  1.60   (65)  23  2.47 (17)  2.58 (12) 
7  1.78 (144)  1.67   (57)  24  2.57 (14)  2.60 (10) 
8  1.85 (127)  1.77   (52)  25  2.90 (10)  3.12   (8) 
9  1.86 (107)  1.84   (49)  26  2.89   (9)  3.14   (7) 
10  1.91   (90)  1.98   (43)  27  3.00   (8)  3.33   (6) 
11  1.89   (73)  2.00   (35)  28  3.80   (5)  5.33   (3) 
12  1.87   (67)  2.00   (32)  29  3.00   (4)  4.50   (2) 
13  1.86   (59)  1.94   (31)  30  3.33   (3)  4.00   (2) 
14  1.96   (47)  2.08   (24)  31  4.00   (2)  4.00   (2) 
15  2.23   (39)  2.40   (20)  32  3.00   (2)  3.00   (2) 
16  2.22   (32)  2.25   (16)  33  3.00   (2)  3.00   (2) 
17  2.16   (31)  2.19   (16)  34  2.50   (2)  2.50   (2) 
 
 
  To our knowledge, no one has studied how the scope of exiting firms changes with 
age up to the time of exit, but we can examine this for lasers. Table 2 orders each year- 
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firm observation by the number of years yet to elapse before the firm exits.
16 Proposition 
14 is strongly supported. The trend in the average number of laser types is steadily up-
ward from one year prior to exit through 25 years prior to exit, after which there were 




Average Number of Laser Types of Exiting Firms in Each Year Prior to Exit 
(Number of firms in parentheses) 
YEARS BEFORE 
EXIT 
ALL EXITING FIRMS Y EARS BEFORE 
EXIT 
ALL EXITING FIRMS 
1  1.45 (328)  16  2.06 (16) 
2  1.48 (222)  17  1.87 (15) 
3  1.69 (171)  18  2.00 (15) 
4  1.74 (146)  19  2.08 (12) 
5  1.74 (127)  20  2.18 (11) 
6  1.65 (101)  21  2.33  (9) 
7  1.66  (87)  22  2.33  (9) 
8  1.76  (75)  23  3.00  (5) 
9  1.70  (57)  24  3.00  (4) 
10  1.64  (47)  25  3.50  (2) 
11  1.58  (38)  26  1.50  (2) 
12  1.80  (35)  27  1.00  (2) 
13  1.82  (28)  28  1.00  (2) 
14  1.78  (23)  29  1.00  (2) 
15  1.79  (19)  30  1.00  (1) 
 
 
  The basis for this pattern is that the probability of exit decreases with the number 
of types of lasers produced, as reflected in Proposition 5. We can also evaluate this pre-
                                          
16 Obviously this can only be done retrospectively for the 328 firms (out of 464) that actually exit 
during the years we have observed.  
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diction directly. Table 3 presents the fraction of firms exiting in all years as a function of 
the number of laser types produced, where the number of observations indicates the 
number of firm-years over which each fraction was computed (e.g., across all years there 
were 1,503 instances of firms producing one laser). The exit rate is highest for firms pro-
ducing only one laser type and then declines sharply as the number of laser types pro-
duced increases. Apart from the slightly higher exit rate of firms producing four versus 





 Probability of Exit by Number of Laser Types Produced 
NUMBER OF LASER TYPES E XIT RATE N O. OF OBSERVATIONS 
1 0.15  1503   
2  0.13    589 
3  0.08    285 
4  0.09      92 
5  0.03      31 
6  0.00      21 
7  0.00      18 
8  0.00        5 
 
 
  The model associates all entry and exit, along with growth and decline, with the 
creation and destruction of submarkets. Klepper and Sleeper [2005] analyze entry in la-
sers by spinoffs, which are firms founded by employees of laser firms. Their illustrative 
examples support the idea that spinoff entrants initially serviced new submarkets, ones 
that were not surprisingly related to the submarkets their parents serviced. More gener-
                                          
17 This small departure may be due to three suspicious firms that were listed for only one year as 
producing four lasers. Only six other firms were listed in their first year as producing four lasers. 
The three firms listed for only one year may not have been manufacturers, with the error in list-
ing them caught in the next year. If they are eliminated, the patterns would conform precisely 
with Proposition 5.  
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ally, the model implies that entry and exit should be clustered at the submarket level. 
Entry results from the creation of a new submarket, just as exit can occur only as the 
result of the destruction of a submarket. Therefore, all entry at a given moment in time 
must occur by firms entering the same submarket, and all exit must occur by firms par-
ticipating in the same submarket. However, the extent to which we see entry and exit 
clustered within submarkets depends on the time-interval considered. The longer the in-
terval, the less entry and exit will be concentrated in one submarket.
18 
  To test this, the lasers produced by each firm in their first year and last year were 
computed for the 25-year period 1970-1994, which encompasses the period when all but 
the Excimer laser was consistently produced. Accordingly, the Excimer laser was ex-
cluded from the analysis. The years were grouped into five five-year periods, from 1970-
1974 to 1990-1994, and for each period the number of firms producing each of the eight 
lasers other than Excimer in their entry and exit year was computed. Table 4 presents 
the figures for the entrants and Table 5 for exiting firms.
19 
  Consider first entry. Table 4 indicates that four of the eight laser types, CO2, HeNe, 
SState, and Semic, attracted considerably more entrants than the other four laser types. 
These were also the lasers that were the most frequently produced by all firms, not just 
entrants. This would be expected if these laser types had the most submarkets. More 
importantly, our model predicts that there should be more clustering of laser types in 
the five-year intervals than in the 25-year interval spanning the five five-year periods. 
Let pit denote the probability that an entrant in period t produces laser i in period t, and 
let pi denote the probability that an entrant over all periods produces laser i when it en-
ters. If clustering occurs, then the pit should differ from pi for all i and t. We can test this 
hypothesis against the null hypothesis of pit=pi for all i and t using the Chi-squared sta-
tistic for contingency tables. The Chi-squared statistic, which has 28 degrees of freedom, 
                                          
18 Let n1(t1), n2(t2),  . . . . , nk(tk), t < t1 <  . . . < tk < t+T, denote the number of entrants into all 
k submarkets that arrived at times  [, ] i tt t T ∈ + . Then, the fraction of firms entering submarket 
i, mi=ni/(n1+ n2+ . . . .+nk), is strictly decreasing in k. As k is increasing in T, the claim follows. 
19  When firms produced more than one laser type in their entry or exit year, each was listed in 
Tables 4 and 5, but for simplicity this was ignored in the implementation of the statistical tests.  
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exceeds 88, which is significant at the .001 level. Thus, clustering of entry by laser types 
is strongly supported. The entries in Table 4 in bold are the ones that exceed their  
expected number by at least 1.65 standard deviations.
20 Using the normal approximation 
to the binomial, the probability of the actual number exceeding this threshold is .05 (the 
Chi-squared statistic takes into account interdependencies in these probabilities). The 
laser types that attracted disproportionate numbers of entrants in each period varied 
considerably over the five periods. In the first period, it was HeNe lasers, in the second 
Dye lasers, in the third CO2 and GasOth lasers, in the fourth period SState lasers, and in 




Lasers Produced by Entrants in First Year 
PERIOD CO2 D YE G ASOTH H ECD H ENE I ON SSTATE S EMIC  ALL TYPES 
1970-74 10  7  10  2  23  7 13 5  77 
1975-79 3  10  9 3  15  6  6  14 66 
1980-84  28  7  14  3 13 7 19 10  101 
1985-89 20  6  5  1  14  8  36  21 111 
1990-94 14  13  6  2  12  8  44 37  136 
ALL YEARS 75  43 44  11  77 36  118  87  491 
 
 
  The exit patterns in Table 5 also exhibit statistically significant clustering. The Chi-
squared statistic equals 45.2, which is significant at the .025 level. The bold entries, 
which are computed analogously to those in Table 4, indicate the lasers that had unusu-
ally high exit in each of the periods. Comparing the laser types with high entry and 
                                          
20 For laser i, the expected number in period t was computed as fiNt, where fi equals the total 
number of times laser i was produced in a firm’s first year divided by the total number of lasers 
produced in their first year by entrants over the 25-year period, and Nt is the the total number of 
lasers produced by entrants in period t. The standard deviation was computed as [fi(1−fi)Nt]
1/2.   
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those with high exit in each period, there is considerable overlap. In the first, third, and 
fifth periods the laser type with exit exceeding the .05 cutoff also had entry exceeding 
the .05 cutoff. Among the other laser types in the entry and exit tables exceeding the .05 
cutoff, their counterpart in the other table also tended to be above its expected value, 
though not enough to exceed the .05 threshold. This is suggestive of creative destruction, 
with the occurrence of new submarkets within a laser type destroying other submarkets 
within the laser type. While this was not included in our model, it is not inconsistent 




 Lasers Produced by Exiting Firms in Last Year 
PERIOD CO2 D YE G ASOTH H ECD H ENE I ON SSTATE S EMIC  ALL TYPES 
1970-74 13  6  8  0  25  9 16 10  87 
1975-79 2  3  3  0  12  2 6 7  35 
1980-84 13  7  10  1 9 7 12  13  72 
1985-89  25  6 8 1  12  10  27  8  97 
1990-94 18  14  5  1  14  6  35  17 110 
ALL YEARS 71  36 34 3  72  34  96 55  401 
 
 
  There are further analyses that could be conducted to test even more detailed pre-
dictions of the model, but the ones we featured get at the essence of the model. The av-
erage firm increased its scope as it aged, while exiting firms decreased their scope as they 
aged. More diversified firms were less likely to exit. Both entry and exit were clustered 




  In empirical analysis we are accustomed to treating industries as homogeneous, al-
though we are well aware that the way data are reported from industrial censuses typi-
cally lumps together a lot of diverse submarkets. Unfortunately, this diversity is not 
merely an easily-corrected artifact of reporting conventions. If submarkets arrive and de-
part in unpredictable fashion, there is little chance that we can devise practical proce-
dures to purge broad industrial data of the diversity of firm activity. Instead, we need to 
devise models that acknowledge the diversity.  
  We developed a model in which firms’ fortunes are determined by the success they 
have in exploiting the opportunities presented as new submarkets arise, and the time 
that elapses before those opportunities vanish. We showed that a remarkably sparse 
model having submarkets as the driving force can explain a large number of empirical 
regularities that for some time have been the subject of intense theorizing. Most notable 
is the ability of our model to generate predictions about the effects of age on growth and 
survival. The model predicts that (i) conditional on size, firm survival is increasing in 
firm age; (ii) conditional on size and survival, firm growth is decreasing in age; (iii) con-
ditioning on size but not on survival, growth does not depend on age; (iv) conditional on 
size, the variance of firm growth is declining in firm age; and (v) the mean and variance 
of firm size rise with the age of a cohort, but skewness declines. These predictions match 
precisely with empirical observation. 
 Jovanovic’s  [1982]  selection  model and Cooley and Quadrini’s [2001] model of finan-
cial market frictions with persistent firm shocks have previously generated some of these 
age effects. Our model and theirs are not mutually exclusive. There is ample evidence 
that firms have different abilities, and selection is an important determinant of which 
firms exit.
21 Financial market frictions also seem to be necessary to explain why age is 
related to various financial characteristics of the firms. However, Jovanovic’s conclusion 
that the ability of his model to generate age effects shows that selection matters, and 
                                          
21 In our own work (Klepper [2002] and Thompson [2005]) we have provided direct evidence for 
selection.  
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Cooley and Quadrini’s conclusion that financial factors are important for the properties 
of the growth of firms, both seem to be premature given that we can generate age effects 
that appear more consistent with the empirical regularities using a simple model in 
which there is neither selection nor financial friction. 
  One possible interpretation of our analysis, therefore, is that once the dynamics of 
intra-industry diversity is accounted for, there may be little left in the empirical regulari-
ties to discriminate between competing models of industrial dynamics. This is probably 
going too far. Our analysis has shown that the concept of submarkets can generate quali-
tative behavior consistent with the empirical regularities, but no claim is made about the 
concept’s quantitative power. Thus, any of the alternative mechanisms in the previous 
literature could be quantitatively important. What is needed, then, is a new direction of 
empirical effort aimed at constructing data sets that may enable us to assess the relative 
importance of alternative sources of age effects.  
     Much of the early literature on firm-size distributions and growth was directed to-
ward understanding how industry output got divided up among competing firms and 
why market structure differed across industries. If we want to learn more about the de-
terminants of market structure, it may also be instructive to turn our empirical focus 
away from purely statistical patterns in the data. Indeed, a fruitful approach might be to 
explore empirical irregularities, both across industries and over time. For example, the 
laser industry experienced a steady growth in the number of producers over time. How-
ever, a number of prominent industries have experienced sharp shakeouts in the number 
of producers as they evolved despite robust growth in output. Our model cannot account 
for this. While this helps delineate the limits of our model, it may also be revealing 
about the determinants of growth in ways that statistical regularities cannot reveal. 
  Indeed, we suspect that the experience of industries that have undergone shakeouts 
may actually support the importance of submarket phenomena for firm entry, exit, and 
growth. The histories of autos, tires, and televisions, each of which experienced a pro-
nounced shakeout in the number of producers, are instructive (cf. Klepper and Simons 
[1997]). At first, many different types of autos and tires were produced and firms tended 
to specialize in the product varieties they produced. Geographic markets may also have 
been segmented. But subsequently, major product innovations slowed in both products,  
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limiting the creation of new submarkets and opportunities for entry. Producers soon ex-
panded nationally and strong economies of scope across different product varieties led 
firms to diversify widely, limiting the protection afforded by different submarkets. Both 
developments may explain why in both industries entry eventually dried up and the 
number of firms subsequently declined for many years. Meaningful submarkets in televi-
sion were more limited from the outset of the industry than in autos and tires and the 
only major innovation that occurred in televisions was color tv, which was successfully 
introduced over 15 years after the start of the industry. This may help explain why en-
try was concentrated in the first five years of the industry and the number of producers 
subsequently declined sharply.  
  Another industry irregularity that may have something to do with submarkets is 
abrupt turnover in the leaders of the industry, sometimes after long stability in the lead-
ing firms. For example, in the tire industry Goodyear, Goodrich, U.S. Rubber (Uni-
royal), and Firestone dominated the U.S. market for over 60 years until the advent of 
the radial tire. Radial tires were initially purchased by small car owners in Europe, and 
European firms pioneered their development. Later radials took over much of the U.S. 
market, at which point all the U.S. firms lost a great deal of market share and all but 
Goodyear sold out to foreign producers (French [1991]). In the disk drive industry, the 
leaders turned over three times after the introduction of successively smaller disk drives 
that initially catered to new buyers of mini-computers, personal computers, and laptops 
respectively. Unexpectedly, these smaller drives were improved sufficiently to take over 
much of the market, causing the decline of the leaders of the industry, who were slow to 
produce the new, smaller drives (Christensen [1993]). In both instances, the development 
of a new submarket that turned out to have much wider appeal than originally antici-
pated precipitated a major change in the industry’s leaders. 
  These examples suggest that submarket phenomena may prove to be an attractive 
way to explain industry irregularities, but we have a long way to go before this can be 
convincingly established. Our model embodies a much simpler account of submarkets 
than these examples require. Both the probability of entry into a new submarket and the 
size draw upon entry are independent of size and age. Furthermore, all entry into sub-
markets occurs immediately, and there is no exit from a submarket until it is destroyed.  
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Some of these assumptions can be relaxed without undermining the distinctive implica-
tions of the model, but there is a limit to how far this can go.
22  So we don’t expect our 
model to be equally important in all industries. The laser industry is virtually a proto-
type for where we expect the model to be especially applicable—a steady creation of new 
submarkets, limited participation of firms in different submarkets, and no one submarket 
that dominates the industry. 
  For industries with similar characteristics, our model may usefully serve as an em-
pirical framework for further research into market structure, in the spirit of Ericson and 
Pakes [1995]. We provided an example of how one particular technological structure, in 
which the rate of entry, θ, into new submarkets depends on R&D effort, would give rise 
in equilibrium to the stochastic processes we have modeled. Klette and Kortum [2004] 
provide another. These structures might be useful for asking questions about such issues 
as the consequences of R&D policies. For example, a subsidy to R&D raises θ, and our 
analysis shows that this in turn increases the mean and variance of firm size while de-
creasing skewness; it reduces firm failure rates; and it decreases the rate of mean rever-
sion in firm size. This example is purely illustrative, because the structure of the model 
is intentionally very general. It can encompass a wide variety of technological structures 
and modes of competition that give rise to the within-submarket distribution of market 
shares, and it can allow for a number of ways in which new opportunities arrive and are 
exploited by firms. In future work we intend to build upon this framework to explore the 
consequences of different technological environments, market structures and policies. We 
hope others see value in doing so as well. 
                                          
22 For example, we can allow the probability of entry into a new submarket to increase with the 
number of submarkets in which the firm participates, up to the point where it is proportional to 
the number of submarkets in which the firm participates, and still retain the distinctive predic-
tions of the model. In the proportional case, the expected increment to size from new submarkets 
will be proportional to the number of submarkets in which a firm participates, but its expected 
percentage growth from new submarkets will be inversely related to its average size per submar-
ket. Consequently, expected firm growth would still decline with firm size and also with firm age 
conditioning on survival.   
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Appendix: Proofs  
LEMMA 1: Let pk(t), k=0,1, 2, 3 . . ., denote the probability that exactly k submarkets are active at 
time t. Then, 
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PROOF. The proof is based on an exposition in Takács [1958, pp. 67-8]. Assume that N(t) sub-
markets, in addition to the first, have been created at times τi, 0 < τ1 < τ2 <  . . . τN(t) ≤ t. The 
probability that the i
th market is still active at t is given by 1( ) i Ht τ −− . For Poisson events, τi 




Pr{submarket is active at } 1 ( )
t
it t H v d v − = − ∫ .    
It then follows that, conditional on there being N(t) submarkets that arrived after t=0, the num-
ber of active submarkets apart from the first, n
*(t), is binomial: 
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tH v d v ρλ = − ∫ . Finally, the probability that the first submarket is still active is sim-
ply 1−H(t). It then follows that the density of n(t), the number of active markets including the 
first, is given by Lemma 1.  
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. As t →∞ the first submarket vanishes with probability 1, so the as-
ymptotic distribution of the number of all active submarkets is Poisson. It therefore suffices to 
show that  ()
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where the second line was obtained from an integration by parts, and the third upon noting that 
a finite mean requires that  () 1 Ht →  at a rate O(t).  
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PROOF: Excluding the industry’s first submarket, the number of submarkets in which a firm is 
active is the sum of n Bernoulli trials with probability of success θ, where n is Poisson with mean 
ρ(t). The distribution of the random sum is therefore 
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which, following similar rearrangements used to prove Lemma 1, can be written as 
 










Thus, the random sum has a Poisson distribution with mean θρ(t). Adding to this the probabil-
ity, θ(1−H(t)), that the firm is active at time t in the industry’s first submarket arrives at the 
stated result.  
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. As t →∞, the first submarket vanishes with probability one. Hence, 
Proposition 2 follows from directly Lemma 2 directly upon letting t →∞. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. As t →∞, the first submarket vanishes with probability one. Recall 
that firm age is defined as the time that has elapsed since the firm last entered a state of zero 
submarket activity. Since exit is due to submarket destruction and submarket destruction is inde-
pendent of subsequent arrivals, firm age is independent of the subsequent arrival of submarkets. 
The process of submarket arrivals is therefore an equilibrium Poisson process in the sense of Cox 
and Isham [1980:8]. The remainder of the proof consequently follows the steps for Lemma 2, re-
placing t by s and ignoring the first submarket. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. The characteristic function, φy(r), for the unconditional distribution of 
size for a firm of age s is given by  
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where the second line makes use of the distribution given in Proposition 3, and the third line 




− =∑ . The moments can be obtained from the 
characteristic function in the usual manner. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. Let  12 ( | , ,... , ) nn Gz z z τ  denote the distribution of the first passage 
time, τ, to a state of zero active markets for a firm with n submarkets of ages zi. Now add one 
submarket of age zn+1. By construction, the first passage distribution is given by 
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which completes the proof. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6. Given Proposition 5, we need only establish that n is increasing in y 
and s. Size, age, and submarket participation are related by 
  yn x = , n and x independent, 
  () sf nε =+ ,  () 0 E ε = ,   /() 0 f n > , n and ε independent. 
Consider the regression equation, 
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To prove Proposition 7, we will need the following lemma: 
LEMMA 3. Consider a firm of age s in the stationary state and active in at least one submarket. 
The distribution of the ages of the submarkets in which the firm is active satisfies 
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where  / () () / ( 1 () ) hz H z Hz = −   is the exit hazard for a submarket of age z.  (;) Gzs has the 
following properties: i) It is strictly increasing and concave over its domain with 
(0; ) 0 Gs =  and  (;) 1 Gss = ; ii) (stochastic dominance) For any  // / ss >  and  // (0, ] zs ∈ , 
// / (; ) (; ) Gzs Gzs < . 
PROOF. All submarkets entered by the firm have births uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 
s]. The probability that a submarket entered when the firm was age τ is still active when the firm 
is age s is (1 ( )) Hs τ −− . Thus, for any  / {, } ττ , the probability that a market entered at age τ 
divided by the probability that a market entered at age  / τ  is still active is 
/ (1 ( ))/(1 ( )) Hs Hs ττ −− −−. Let  (;) Gzs denote the distribution of ages of active markets for a 
firm of age s, and let  (;) gzs  denote the corresponding density. The density  (;) gzs  must satisfy 
the relationship 
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which can be written as 
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The solution to this differential equation is 








for some constant, c(s), to be determined. Integrating over z yields 









Noting that  (;) 1 Gss = , the constant satisfies 
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so  (;) Gzs is as given in the lemma. The properties of  (;) Gzs can be verified by direct calculation. 





















which is simply H(z) with domain truncated at s. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7. Write output as  () ()() n ys x sns = , where  () n xs  is the average size of a 
firm of age s in each of its n(s) submarkets. Over the subsequent interval of length T, the ex-
pected number of new submarkets gained that remain active is, from Lemma 1,  
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The firm has an expected size in each of these submarkets of E(x). Now, given a submarket of age 
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sequently, taking expectations over all possible ages using the distribution of the ages of currently 
active submarkets in Lemma 3, we have 
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Each lost submarket has an expected size of  () n xt . Hence, we can express the expected growth 
rate of the firm in terms of the difference between expected gains and losses:  
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from which we have 
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while   constant (, ; , )/ ()| yy dg t t T y s ds t +  is a somewhat more complicated expression with ambigu-
ous sign. For exponentially distributed submarket lives, using  / () 1 z Hz e µ − = −  and evaluating 
the integrals yields 
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which is the basis for the corollary to Proposition 7. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8. To analyze the growth of surviving firms, let 
(, ; , | ( ) 0 ) y gt t T y sn t T ++ >  denote the mean growth rate of non-exiting firms, and let 
{ } Pr ( ) 0 | ( ), ( ) nt T yt st +=  denote the probability of exiting. Noting that exiting firms have 
growth rates of –1, we can write the unconditional mean growth rate as 
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In view of the ambiguous effect of age in the case of arbitrary H(z), we consider the exponential 
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. 
Given that the probability of firm exit is decreasing in firm size and age when H(z) is exponential, 
it follows that mean firm growth and firm size and age for surviving firms must be related accord-
ing to Proposition 8.  
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9. Submarket destruction and creation are independent. Consequently, 
the variance of growth for a firm of size y(t) active in n(t) submarkets can be written as the sum 
of the variance of changes in firm size caused by entry into new submarkets and changes caused 
by destruction of some or all of the existing n(t) submarkets. The increment in size contributed 
by new arrivals over an interval of length T is equivalent in distribution to the size of a firm of 
age T. Thus, substituting T for s in the variance given in Proposition 3 and dividing by the 
square of current size gives the variance of the growth rate contributed by the gains over T, 
[] 22
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  ∫ . This is decreasing in y but independent of n. 
   We show next that the contribution of existing submarkets is decreasing in y for fixed n and 
decreasing in n for fixed y. Consider a firm of size y active in n submarkets with sizes x1, x2, . . . 




= = ∑ . The destruction of each of these submarkets is independent and, as-
suming an exponential distribution, occurs in the interval of length T with probability  / T e µ − . 
Hence, the contribution to the variance of output of each current submarket is, from the variance 
of a Bernoulli trial,  // 2 (1 ) TT
i ee x µµ −− − . The contribution to the variance of the growth rate of 
all existing submarkets is therefore 






























== ∑∑  is (i) decreasing in y for given n, and (ii) decreasing in n for given y. 
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As the denominator is positive, the sign of the derivative depends only on the sign of the numera-
tor. Now, the numerator can be expressed as  




ii i i j j
ii j i i
xx x E x x x
== ≠ =






= ∑  (which enables us to abstract from the denominator in [A.2]), and av-





ii i i j j
ii j i i
Ex x x Ex x x
== ≠ =

 − = − 
 
∑∑ ∑  








= − ∑ . 





(1 ) | |
nn n n
ii i i i
ii i i
Ex x x n Ex x Ex x
== = =
                − = −−                  
∑∑ ∑ ∑  
                    
1






     = −−        ∑ 0 < . 






== ∑∑  declines. This analysis can be repeated for each existing submarket, which 
completes part (i) of the proof. 
  For part (ii), increase the number of existing submarkets by one, adjusting the size of sub-
markets from xi to 
/




i i ii xx
+










i i i i
n n










which will complete the proof. The denominators on both sides of the inequality are the same, so 
we can restrict attention again to the numerators:  
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Some tedious algebra yields 
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Assume that the (n+1)
th submarket is constructed by subtracting a random amount from each of 
the existing n submarkets such that for i=1,2,  . . ,n, 
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Substituting these expressions into (A.3) and rearranging yields 
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which completes the proof. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  10. i) From Lemma 2, the expected number of active firms is 
  ( ) {}
// (( ) ) 1 ( 1 ) ( 1 ) e x p ( 1 ) tt ENt C e e µµ θθ θ λ µ −−   = −− + −− −    
. (A.4) 
(A.4) is strictly increasing in t iff  (1 ) / θλ µ λµ < − . If  (1 ) / θλ µ λµ > − , the expected number of 
active firms initially falls, but then must eventually rise as t increases. ii) The expected number of 
firms entering the industry in an interval dt is equal to the expected number of inactive firms 
times the expected rate of entry to submarkets, θλdt.  Under the assumption that 
(1 ) / θλ µ λµ < − , this is clearly decreasing with t. As the number of active firms increases with t, 
then it is clear that entry as a proportion of active firms also declines with industry age. For 
(1 ) / θλ µ λµ > − , the expected entry rate initially falls, but then must eventually rise as t in-
creases. ii) The expected number of firms exiting in an interval dt is proportional to the number 
of firms active in exactly one market. This expected number is given by 
  ( ) {}
// / (1 ) (1 ) exp (1 ) (1 ) tt t Ce e e µµ µ θθ θ λ µ θλµ −− −  − + −− − −  
 
                                                            {}
// exp (1 ) tt Ce e µµ θθ λ µ −−   + −−    
. (A.5) 
The first term gives the probability that a firm is in exactly one market after the first  times the 
probability that either the first submarket has vanished or the firm did not enter the first sub-
market. The second term is the probability of being in zero submarkets after the first times the 
probability of still being active in the first submarket. Taking the ratio (A.5)/(A.4), it is easy to 
produce numerical examples in which, even for  (1 ) / θλ µ λµ < − , the expected rate of exit need 
not change monotonically with respect to time, and may approach its asymptotic limit, 
/(1 ) ee θλµ θλµ θλµ −− − , from above or below. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 12. Define  () YT +  as the expected number of newly created submarkets 
the firm enters between t and T that are still active at time T, and define  (() , ) Yn t T − as the ex-
pected number of submarkets existing at time t that are destroyed by time t+T. The variables 




() 1 ( )
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−   
∫∫ . 
Thus,  [( ) ( ) ] [] 0 Ent T nt + − ><  as  () (( ) ,) [] 0 YT Yn t T + − − >< . It is easy to show that Y
+(T) and 
Y
−(n(t),T) are continuous, monotonically increasing functions of T, with Y
+(0)=Y
−(n(t),0)=0, 
lim ( ) ( ) T YT E n θλµ +
→∞ ==  and lim ( ( ), ) ( ) T Yn t T n t −
→∞ = . Figure A.1 plots Y
+(T) along 
with Y
−(n(t),T) for two values of n(t). Clearly, for each n(t) there exists a T
*(n(t)) such that if 
n(t)>[<]E[n], then  [( ) ( ) ] [] 0 Ent T nt + − <>  for all  *(( ) ) TT n t ≥ .  
  The extension to include random draws from F(x) is straightforward. A firm of above [below] 
average size in each of its submarkets can expect future submarkets in which it participates to be 
smaller [larger] on average. Mean reversion in the number of submarkets consequently implies 
mean reversion in firm size. 









PROOF OF PROPOSITION 13. Consider a firm active in n submarkets. Let xi, i=1, 2, . . .,n denote 
the firm’s size in each of the n submarkets. (i) Let  n x  denote the average size of the firm in each  
 45
submarket. By definition,  / n ny x =  and so  (|) ( 1 / ) n En y y E x = . As  0 i x ≥   i ∀ , then 
(1/ ) 0 n Ex >  and  (|) / 0 dE n y dy > . (ii) Define zi=F(xi). zi has a uniform distribution on [0,1] so 
Pr{ } i zcc ≤ = ,  [0,1] c ∀∈ . It then follows that the probability that the firm is among the top 
100c percent in at least one submarket is  {} {} Pr  for some  1 Pr ii zc i yc i >= −≤ ∀ 1 n c = − , 
which is strictly increasing in n. Part (iii) is a straightforward consequence of parts (i) and (ii). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 14. The proof proceeds by obtaining an explicit expression for 
{} Pr ( ) 0 | ( ) nt s nt k += = and applying Bayes’ rule to obtain  {} Pr ( ) | ( ) 0 nt k nt s =+ = . An 
expression for  (( ) | ( ) 0 ) Ent nt s += is then derived and shown to be increasing in s at a decreas-
ing rate. 
  Consider the stationary equilibrium, and assume that  / () 1 x Hx e µ − = − , in which case the 
process for n(t) reduces to an immigration-death model in which the immigration rate is θλ, and 
the death rate is µ
−1n(t). Now, without loss of generality, re-index time so that t=0. The immigra-
tion-death process must satisfy: 
  ()
1
01 0 0 (| ) ( | ) 1 ( )( | ) nn n vt tn v tn t n t t vtn θλ θλ µ−
−
  +∆ = ∆ + −− ∆   
 
                                                   ( )
1
10 () 1 ( | ) ( ) n nt v t n t o t µ−
+ ++ ∆ + ∆ , (A.6) 
where  0 (| ) n vt tn +∆  denotes the probability that a firm is active in n submarkets at time t+∆t 
given that it was active in n0 submarkets at time 0, and where  10 (| ) 0 vt n − ≡ . In an immigra-
tion-death process, there are only three paths by which one can arrive at n at time t+∆t. First, 
one might increase n by one unit having been in state n−1 at time t; this happens with probabil-
ity θλvn−1(t|n0)∆t+o(∆t). Second, one might have already been in state n, and there was no change 
in the state during the interval; this possibility occurs with probability 
[1−θλ−µ
−1n(t)]vn(t|n0)∆t+o(∆t). Third, one could arrive in state n by losing one submarket, which 
occurs with probability µ
−1(n(t)+1)vn+1(t|n0)∆t+o(∆t). 
 Subtracting  vn(t|n0) from both sides of (A.6), dividing through by ∆t, and taking limits as 
0 t ∆→ , we obtain 
      () ( )
/1 1
10 0 10 (| ) (| ) ( ) (| ) ( ) 1 (| ) no n n n vtn v tn n tvtn n t v tn θλ θλ µµ −−
− + = − ++ + , (A.7) 
for n=0,1,2, . . . .  
  The first task is to obtain an explicit expression for v0(t|n0), which requires that we solve 
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(1 ) ( , | ) ( 1)
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θλ µ− ∂
= − + −
∂
. 
There is an initial condition associated with this partial differential equation. Given the initial 
state n(0)=n0, it follows that vn(0|n0)=0 for all n≠n0, while vn(0|n0)=1 for n=n0. This simplifies 
to  0 *
0 (,0| ) n vs n s = . Saaty [1961:99-101] uses the method of Lagrange to solve this initial value 
problem, the details of which are omitted here:  
  ( ) {} ( )
0 */ /
0 (, | ) e x p ( 1 )1 1 ( 1 )
n tt vs tn s e s e µµ θλµ −− = −− − − , (A.9) 




















As n rises, the expressions implied by (A.10) rapidly become unwieldy. However, our interest is in 
v0(t|n0), which is simply expressed: 
  ( ) {} ( )
0 //
00 (| ) e x p 1 1
n tt vtn e e µµ θλµ −− = −− − . (A.11) 
The final task is to obtain  {} Pr ( ) | ( ) 0 nt T k nt − ==  by applying Bayes’ rule to (A.11):  
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{} { }
{}
P r () P r ( ) 0 | ()
Pr ( ) | ( ) 0
Pr ( ) 0
nt T k nt nt T k
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µµ θλµ θλµ −− −−
= , 
which is Poisson with mean  ( )
/ 1 T e µ θλµ − − . It then follows that 
  [ ] / () | ( ) 0
0 T dE n t T n t
e
dT
µ θλ − − =
=> , 
and  
  [ ]
2 /
2
() | ( ) 0
0





= − < , 
as claimed in the proposition. 
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